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I.  JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS 
A. The Traditional Approach 
The courts have been of two minds in their handling of unrepresented li-
tigants.  The traditional view has been that those who proceed pro se must 
look out for themselves.  They will be expected to comply with all the rules 
regulating the litigation process and will not be given special dispensation 
because of their lack of knowledge or legal skill.  The United States Su-
preme Court relied on this view in its 1975 ruling in Faretta v. California.1  
There, the Court held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment 
right to represent him or herself.  The Court cautioned, however, that: “The 
right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the cour-
troom.  Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of proce-
 
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy.  A.B. Kenyon College, 1969; 
J.D. Harvard University, 1972.  I would like to thank Ryan Helgeson and James Vanzant for 
their invaluable research assistance. 
 1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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dural and substantive law.”2  This proposition has been reiterated regularly 
and amplified upon in both criminal and civil decisions since Faretta. 
In conformity with this view, the Supreme Court has determined that a 
trial judge, generally, has no obligation to assist pro se litigants.  As the 
Court bluntly put it, there is no “constitutional right to receive personal in-
struction from the trial judge on courtroom procedure.”3  One of the key 
justifications for this position is the fear that the trial judge who intervenes 
on behalf of an unrepresented party is likely to undermine his or her neu-
trality.  Speaking for a five-member majority in Pliler v. Ford,4 Justice 
Thomas used the neutrality argument in rejecting a claim that a district 
judge was obliged to assist an unrepresented litigant with “details of federal 
habeas corpus procedure.”5  Justice Thomas asserted that such assistance 
“would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decision makers.”6 
In the adversarial framework, the most sensible and effective approach 
when courts are faced with self-represented litigants who seem incapable of 
managing their cases may not be judicial intervention, but the provision of 
counsel.7  Courts have held that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution 
requires the appointment of a lawyer for the unrepresented impecunious 
criminal defendant at public expense whenever there is a possibility of in-
carceration.8  On the civil side, by contrast, the courts have recognized no 
similar right.  In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a case involving 
the termination of parental rights, the Supreme Court established a pre-
sumption against any right to the appointment of counsel in civil actions.9  
While Lassiter did not literally rule out judicial recognition of such a right, 
it has been interpreted as having erected a virtually insurmountable barrier 
to any due process claim regarding civil legal assistance.10  Although courts 
have long recognized judicial discretion to appoint counsel in particularly 
 
 2. Id. at 834 n.46. 
 3. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (noting that the potential difficul-
ties arising from this rule were mitigated in criminal matters by the presence of “standby 
counsel,” assigned by the court to assist those accused who elected to proceed pro se). 
 4. 542 U.S. 225 (2004). 
 5. Id. at 231. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Counsel is at the heart of the adversarial framework. See generally STEPHAN 
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICA-
TION (1988). 
 8. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 343 (1963). 
 9. 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 
 10. See Kimberly A. Owens, Right to Counsel—The Third Circuit Delivers Indigent 
Civil Litigants from “Exceptional Circumstances”, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1163, 1163 & nn.1-2 
(1994). 
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compelling circumstances,11 that authority suffered a serious blow when 
the Supreme Court decided Mallard v. United States District Court.12  The 
Court held that an unwilling attorney could not be required to accept an un-
compensated court assignment to represent a pro se litigant pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).  The statute allows a court, in its discretion, to make 
such appointments.  The Court thereby reduced the likelihood of the provi-
sion of counsel, even as a matter of judicial discretion. 
B. An Opposing View 
Were this all there was to say about representation and assistance, the 
picture would be bleak indeed.  The story, however, is not so simple.  Sev-
eral years before the Court decided Faretta, it held, in Haines v. Kerner,13 
that in reviewing pleadings filed by unrepresented parties, judges were to 
hold the submissions “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers.”14  Courts have extended this accommodating attitude 
toward the efforts of parties representing themselves to other areas of litiga-
tion including service of process, pursuit of discovery, responses to mo-
tions for dismissal or summary judgment, and compliance with the rules of 
evidence.15  The Ninth Circuit has been among the leading advocates of the 
liberal treatment of pro se efforts.  In Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Depart-
ment,16 the circuit court stated: “This court recognizes that it has a duty to 
ensure that pro se litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits 
of their claim due to ignorance of technical procedural requirements.”17  
Such sympathetic handling has made the litigation process somewhat more 
congenial to the self-represented and has involved judges in rendering 
some, albeit modest, assistance to them. 
The organized bar and a significant number of courts have moved 
beyond tolerance of pro se efforts to encouragement of direct judicial assis-
tance.  The American Bar Association (“ABA”) heralded this shift in 2007, 
when, in a Comment to Rule 2.2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
addressing impartiality and fairness, the rule drafters stated: “It is not a vi-
olation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations to en-
 
 11. See, e.g., John Rearden, Jr., Appointed Attorneys for Indigent Civil Litigants in Fed-
eral Court: The Illinois Experience, 94 ILL. B.J. 369, 370 (2006). 
 12. 490 U.S. 296 (1989). 
 13. 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 
 14. Id. at 520. 
 15. See generally John L. Kane, Jr., Debunking Unbundling, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2000, at 
15. 
 16. 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 17. Id. at 699. 
LANDSMAN CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:42 PM 
276 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
sure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”18  
The ABA went further, and in Rule 2.6, with pro se litigants in mind, de-
clared that “a judge shall accord [to all] the right to be heard. . . .”19  These 
changes reflect a rejection of the narrow view of neutrality espoused in Pli-
ler and a willingness to encourage judges to assist the unrepresented. 
A number of courts, judicial administrators, and national organizations 
have, over the past decade, contributed to what one scholar has described 
as an accelerating trend “to accommodate unrepresented litigants and facili-
tate their efforts to present their cases.”20  Steps along this road have in-
cluded: the 1997 Final Report of the Pro Se Implementation Committee of 
the Minnesota Conference of Chief Judges which called for alternative pro-
cedures to facilitate the presentation of pro se claims;21 the declaration in 
2000 by the Conference of State Court Administrators that courts have an 
“obligation” to respond to the needs of the self represented;22 the American 
Judicature Society and State Justice Institute report of 2005 recognizing as 
a “best practice” judicial action to manage the presentation of proof so that 
the claims of the self-represented are addressed on the merits;23 the 2006 
Massachusetts Judicial Guidelines for Civil Hearings Involving the Self-
Represented Litigant, which urge a series of steps to ensure that parties 
proceeding pro se understand court processes and have a meaningful op-
portunity to present their claims;24 and the 2007 State Justice Institute and 
Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts volume, 
Handling Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, which establishes a 
set of principles for the management of pro se cases.25 
The California principles capture the dramatic shift that has occurred as 
courts have begun to erect a partial but increasingly effective safety net to 
protect the unrepresented.  Among the measures urged are that: (1) cases be 
resolved on the merits; (2) courts recognize a duty to prevent miscarriages 
of justice; (3) all court-provided instructions be comprehensible to lay 
people; and (4) rules requiring equal treatment do not “prevent trial judges 
from providing assistance to self-represented litigants to enable them to 
 
 18. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. 4 (2007). 
 19. Id. at R. 2.6. 
 20. Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing 
Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 367, 372 (2008). 
 21. Id. at 372. 
 22. Id. at 373. 
 23. Id. at 376. 
 24. Id. at 377. 
 25. STATE JUSTICE INST. AND JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, 
HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2007), available at http:// 
www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1176151729.08/CA%20pro%20se%20Benchbook.pdf. 
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comply with the rules of evidence and procedure.”26  These proposals may 
not amount to a right to judicial assistance, but they do signal that the unre-
presented increasingly may expect to receive substantial help. 
Similar developments have occurred with respect to the provision of 
counsel.  The barriers erected by Lassister, Mallard, and the rest have not 
been dismantled, but there has been movement toward the recognition of a 
right to a lawyer in a number of settings, most particularly with respect to 
certain issues affecting the family, involuntary commitment, and medical 
treatment.27  These steps come in addition to already existing statutes at 
both the federal28 and state level29 that grant courts discretion to appoint 
counsel in civil proceedings. While courts have generally been reluctant, 
especially in the aftermath of Mallard, to use this discretionary power ex-
cept in “exceptional circumstances,”30 there has been a growing sensitivity 
to the importance of appointing counsel where there is a real opportunity 
for success on the merits.31 
Recent developments clearly have not yet established a guarantee of 
judicial or lawyer assistance to the unrepresented in civil litigation but have 
made courts significantly more sensitive to the needs involved.  Judges are 
authorized to help pro se litigants. Some courts have gone so far as to dec-
lare that judges who place obstacles in the path of pro se parties should be 
criticized or even sanctioned.32  Courts are being urged, Justice Thomas 
notwithstanding, to provide assistance while codes of judicial conduct 
make specific allowance for such intervention.  The appointment of counsel 
represents a genuine option in cases of particular need,33 as well as the po-
tential for expansion if developments continue on their present course. 
 
 26. Id. at 6. 
 27. See Laura Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases, 2006 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245 (2006). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 
 29. More than one-half the states have statutes empowering courts to appoint counsel in 
civil proceedings under a variety of circumstances. See Andrew Scherer, Gideon’s Shelter: 
The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 
23 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 557, 585-86 n.121 (1988). 
 30. See Owens, supra note 10, at 1174-78. 
 31. Id. at 1179-80. 
 32. See Kerry Hill, Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: An Update on Legal and 
Ethical Issues (Aug. 2000), http://www.ajs.org/prose/pro_legal_ethical.asp, cited in Engler, 
supra note 20, at 373 nn.33-34 (describing incidents in California and Colorado where 
judges were censured or otherwise rebuked for mistreatment of pro se litigants). 
 33. See Spencer G. Park, Note, Providing Equal Access to Equal Justice: A Statistical 
Study of Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California in San Francisco, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 844 (1997) (reporting the 
appointment of counsel for pro se litigants on a somewhat regular basis in the Northern Dis-
trict of California). 
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The remainder of this Article will explore the treatment of unrepresented 
litigants in ADR settings.  Section II will examine the difficulties faced by 
pro se litigants in managing their own arbitrations and court-annexed medi-
ations.  It will contend that in these settings the unrepresented may be sub-
stantially more disadvantaged than in litigation.  Section III will explore the 
special risks that arise in ADR proceedings when parties appear alone, in-
cluding: reduced prospects of success, heightened decision maker bias, cor-
rosive paternalism, and lawless adjudications.  Sections IV and V will then 
explore ways in which these risks may be reduced, particularly through the 
provision of counsel. 
II.  THE UNREPRESENTED IN COMPULSORY ADR SETTINGS – THE 
UNAVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE 
A. Arbitration 
From the early 1980s on, the Supreme Court assiduously expanded the 
reach of compulsory arbitration clauses through its reinterpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).34  The process began in 1983 with Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,35 where the 
Court recognized a national policy strongly favoring arbitration.  In 1984 
and 1985, the Court enforced agreements to arbitrate incorporated in adhe-
sion contracts, drafted for the purpose of setting up franchise arrange-
ments.36  Over the course of the next half dozen years, the Court permitted 
drafting parties in the financial industry to compel adherent customers and 
employees to arbitrate rather than litigate a range of statutory claims,37 
eventually even including claims of civil rights violations.38  It then ex-
tended the compulsory arbitration regime to consumers of other sorts.39  
The reach of imposed arbitration was expanded to virtually all consumers 
when, in 2002, the Court decided Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,40 
barring states from imposing consumer-protective limitations on the man-
 
 34. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000).  For an extended discussion of the growth of compulsory 
arbitration see Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 
(2005). 
 35. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 36. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 617-19 
(1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1984). 
 37. See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (concerning RI-
CO and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 claims). 
 38. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 39. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
 40. 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). 
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ner in which arbitration clauses could be established.  This meant that arbi-
tration might be imposed without a signed agreement, by notice sent long 
after the original contract had been made, or even as a printed declaration 
on shrink wrap packaging, so long as a single state would permit such con-
duct and the drafting party was incorporated there.41  Virtually all major 
credit card companies insist on adhesive arbitration agreements,42 which 
are estimated to govern more than one-third of all consumer interactions 
with large corporations.43  Moreover, because of the tendency of contract 
drafters in unregulated markets featuring adhesive conditions to expand 
self-protective requirements, it should be anticipated that the hegemony of 
arbitration clauses is likely to grow in the future.44 
The compulsory arbitration offered to customers, consumers, and em-
ployers has been aptly described as “quick and dirty.”45  It is dominated by 
drafting party repeat players who impose it on an ill-informed and contrac-
tually powerless adhering population.  It is used to control virtually all dis-
putes between the “little guy” and the large scale provider or employer.  It 
frequently offers a sort of second-class justice.  That perception was, per-
haps unwittingly, confirmed by the Congress in 1998 when it authorized 
mandatory Federal court ADR programs,46 but exempted cases involving 
more than $150,000 (along with a number of other sorts of cases) from 
compulsory arbitration.47  As Judge William Schwarzer has pointed out, 
this sort of treatment may be viewed as a signal that mandatory arbitration 
is only useful for “unimportant” matters.48 
Drafting party corporations have a decided advantage in the processes 
they mandate.  The arbitrators involved in handling compulsory proceed-
ings often rely on repeat-player drafters for much of their business.49  This 
 
 41. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 157, 158 (2006). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1639 (2005). 
 44. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36 
(1997). 
 45. Bryant Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a 
Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 932 (2002). 
 46. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See William W. Schwarzer, ADR and the Federal Courts: Questions and Decisions 
for the Future, 7 F.J.C. DIRECTIONS 2, 3 (1994), cited in Caroline Harris Crowne, Note, The 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1768, 1798 n.165 (2001). 
 49. See Landsman, supra note 34, at 1614-16. 
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creates a situation in which arbitrators are beholden to drafters for their li-
velihood and, consciously or unconsciously, have a motivation to decide 
cases in a manner congenial to those sending them business.50  In most cas-
es, moreover, the corporate drafter involved in the arbitration is an expe-
rienced player that has been through the process many times and has a sig-
nificant tactical advantage over the one-shot consumer or employee 
participant.51  The arbitrator is likely to come from a tight-knit homogenous 
population, far less diverse than the consumers or employees who appear 
before him.  When the GAO looked at arbitrators in the financial industry, 
it found that 89% were male, 97% were white, and their average age was 
sixty.52 
Unsophisticated and ill-prepared adhering parties are most often the ones 
being dragged into arbitration by corporate opponents seeking vindication 
of some contractual claim.  The credit card company, First USA, in the ini-
tial two years of its mandatory arbitration program, brought 51,622 claims 
while facing four from its customers.53  The individuals compelled to arbi-
trate are seldom represented by counsel.  When the National Arbitration 
Forum (“NAF”), a large ADR service provider, reported to the State of 
California on cases it had handled between January 2003 and March 2007, 
it disclosed that 96.5% of its consumer lending arbitrations involved unre-
presented consumers.54  Just as counsel is only present on one side, arbitra-
tion results are one-sided as well.  A Christian Science Monitor examina-
tion of consumer debt arbitrations found that creditors won 96% of the 
time.55 
Unlike courts, arbitrators have no authority to assist the litigants appear-
ing before them or to secure counsel for them.  Arbitrators are prohibited 
from providing help to the parties.56  They are present to hear the parties’ 
submissions but not to inquire or intervene.57  If help is going to come to 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits 
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). 
 52. See Landsman, supra note 34, at 1596. 
 53. See Sternlight, supra note 43, at 1655. 
 54. Memorandum, California Consumer Arbitration Data, at 3 (Navigant Consulting, 
July 11, 2008). 
 55. See Simone Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 16, 2007, at 13. 
 56. Joseph L. Daly, Arbitration: The Basics, 5 J. AM. ARB. 1, 12 (2006); see also MOD-
EL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (1983) (emphasizing that a lawyer serving as a third-
party neutral shall communicate that she is not representing either of the parties). 
 57. See Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standard of Conduct 
for Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 87, 101 (1997); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Advisory Con-
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participants in arbitrations, it must come from their own counsel.  Yet, in 
none of the standards set forth in the Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”)58 
or the rules promulgated by the American Bar Association,59 is there any 
authorization whatsoever for the appointment of counsel.  This is not to say 
that the importance of counsel has gone unrecognized.  Both the American 
Arbitration Association and the UAA have declared that there is a right to 
be represented by counsel (at one’s own expense) in arbitration proceed-
ings.60  The UAA prohibits the waiver of that right if the waiver was se-
cured “prior to the initiation of the arbitration proceeding.”61  In explaining 
this principle, the UAA Commentary notes the special importance of coun-
sel “in the context of an arbitration agreement between parties of unequal 
bargaining power.”62  Despite recognizing the importance of counsel and 
the risks posed by unequal power, the uniform act authorizes no steps to as-
sist parties in securing legal help.  In other words, a party may be forced 
into arbitration through the exercise of adhesive power without any hope of 
obtaining assistance, notwithstanding the neutral arbitrator’s clear under-
standing that the parties are not fairly matched and the weaker is in despe-
rate need of legal advice.63 
Thus, unrepresented parties are contractually compelled by their far 
stronger and richer opponents to forego court hearings where there is the 
prospect of judicial assistance and perhaps even some hope for the ap-
pointment of counsel.  Instead, they are required to appear in a forum 
where the adjudicator is prohibited from assisting them, and counsel’s ap-
pointment is literally impossible.  It may be argued that this deprivation of 
legal help is neither intentional nor the doing of the contract drafting party, 
but simply the nature of things in our society.  Assuming no malicious in-
tent on the drafter’s part (a point we will return to), this is still troubling.  
That the financially superior party may be able to impose such conditions 
on its opponents without in any way compensating for the deprivation it 
works seems inequitable.  The Supreme Court in its arbitration decisions, 
 
ception of Lawyers’ Responsibility, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) (analyzing various guide-
lines for lawyers filling the role of neutral). 
 58. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
archives/ulc/uarba/arbitrat1213.pdf. 
 59. The ABA House of Delegates approved the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act in 
2001. 
 60. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, supra note 58 § 16. 
 61. See id. § 16, cmt. 3. 
 62. See id. § 4, cmt. (4)(c). 
 63. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 69 
(1997); see also UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, supra note 58 § 4, cmt. (4)(c) (recognizing that 
there may be power imbalances between the parties, but not allowing the neutral to assist). 
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while endorsing arbitration, has expressed the view that the forum substi-
tuted for the courts must be a fair replacement, comparable to that offered 
in a move from federal to state jurisdiction where there is concurrent juris-
diction.64  When that equivalence is undermined, there is reason to question 
whether the court’s rationale for approving compulsory arbitration has been 
satisfied. 
So far it has been assumed that the powerful adhesion contract drafter 
has not intentionally worked to deprive the adhering party of access to re-
presentation.  That is not the reality some adhering parties have encoun-
tered.  Drafters have, in a number of instances, abused their power not just 
to deprive their employees or customers of representation but of any hear-
ing at all.  One of the most egregious cases of this sort involved the Hooters 
restaurant chain.65  Hooters insisted that all employees arbitrate all claims, 
including those involving statutorily prohibited forms of discrimination.66  
Hooters reserved to itself the exclusive right to select all arbitrator candi-
dates.67  Employees, but not the restaurant, were required to give notice of 
their claims.  Hooters alone could move for summary disposition, make a 
record of the proceedings, and sue in court to vacate an arbitral decision 
that exceeded the arbitrator’s authority.  The Fourth Circuit condemned this 
arrangement as “a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitra-
tion.”68  The Hooters case stands for the proposition that when drafters 
seek to deprive their opponents of the means to pursue a hearing, their con-
duct is illegitimate and should be condemned. 
Hooters displayed the lack of subtlety for which it is famous.  It was 
caught, and its scheme was denounced as nothing more than an effort to 
rob employees of an opportunity to be heard and vindicated.  While that 
scheme, on its face, had little to do with access to counsel, it illustrates an 
inclination on the part of some drafters to adopt whatever strategies seem 
viable to thwart adhering party success.  Those more subtle than Hooters 
have launched a series of initiatives that may be construed as efforts to pre-
vent access to counsel and thereby, diminish the prospect of the filing of a 
successful claim.  They have, for example, sought to shorten the statute of 
limitations.69  A prime objective here seems to be to curtail the time in 
which assistance can be sought and legal prospects appraised.  Other draf-
 
 64. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (comparing 
arbitration forum to “concurrent jurisdiction”). 
 65. Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 66. Id. at 936. 
 67. Id. at 938-39. 
 68. Id. at 940. 
 69. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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ters have sought to limit or bar discovery.70  Here, the goal seems to be to 
thwart counsel’s ability to investigate and to prepare an effective case.  
Another ploy has been to narrow the sorts of relief available,71 thereby ren-
dering cases financially unattractive to contingency fee attorneys.  Finally, 
some have moved to cut off awards of statutorily-mandated attorney’s 
fees,72 a step with no other purpose than to deprive adhering parties of 
access to a lawyer. 
Some may object that most of these steps have little to do with access to 
counsel and were not motivated by a desire to keep lawyers out.  A closer 
look suggests otherwise.  Professor Jean Sternlight demonstrated the exis-
tence of such a desire in a recent Stanford Law Review article.73  What is 
more, she pointed out that no less an advocate of arbitration than Samuel 
Estreicher,74 had reached the same conclusion, recognizing that employers 
manipulate the availability of arbitration to reduce the prospect of an em-
ployee obtaining legal assistance.75  That contract drafters are wielding 
their power to prevent access to counsel suggests the need to protect access, 
at least at a level commensurate with that available outside the arbitration 
world, otherwise arbitration becomes a tool to thwart legal claiming. 
Activities that interfere with securing counsel have disturbed a number 
of courts and led to findings that some arbitration agreements are “uncons-
cionable.”76  They are not, however, the most provocative examples of the 
attack on access.  That label is most properly applied to adhesion contract 
drafters’ efforts to thwart class actions.  It has long been understood that 
there are a number of claims that are simply uneconomical to bring on the 
basis of a single victim’s loss.77  These are, most often, cases where a mi-
nor but systematic injury has been done to a large group of similarly si-
tuated individuals by a single perpetrator and individual recovery would 
never warrant the retention of counsel and the prosecution of a lawsuit.  In 
such circumstances, what is needed is a lawyer who can aggregate a large 
number of claims and recover an award that makes the effort economically 
 
 70. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psycare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 684 (Cal. 
2000). 
 71. See, e.g., Adams, 279 F.3d at 894. 
 72. See, e.g., Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2003); Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 73. Sternlight, supra note 43, at 1653. 
 74. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559 (2001). 
 75. Id. at 567-68. 
 76. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
 77. See Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 41, at 168-69. 
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worthwhile.78  Many adhesion contract drafters have sought to bar such ac-
tion by claiming that arbitration clauses require individual hearings79 or by 
expressly prohibiting class action claims.80  The clear thrust of all these ef-
forts is to destroy the legal and monetary basis for attracting counsel.  
Some courts have found this strategy, like other attacks on access and con-
sumers’ interests, an unconscionable deprivation of adhering party rights.81  
Yet others have rejected such arguments,82 and a number of arbitration ser-
vice providers, including the American Arbitration Association and NAF, 
refuse to provide class-based arbitration.83 
In the end, compulsory arbitration has been imposed on a vast body of 
customers, consumers, and employees.  It has removed them from the 
courts, and the legal protections offered there.  It has substituted what often 
amounts to second-class justice.  In the arbitral forum, these parties have 
faced conditions that effectively curtail their access to legal assistance.  
Some of these conditions have been purposely imposed by contract drafters 
with the objective of cutting off counsel and thereby, stifling claims. 
It should be noted that criticism of arbitration has grown over the last 
decade.84  Concern about the high cost of arbitration85 and the absence of 
appellate review have increased.86  While these concerns have not been 
enough to deter South Dakota incorporated credit card companies from tak-
ing advantage of local sweetheart legislation to impose arbitration on their 
nationwide clientele,87 corporate enthusiasm for arbitration with equals has 
weakened.88 
Even in compulsory settings there has been some retreat.  The financial 
industry was, for many years, the leader in the use of compulsory arbitra-
 
 78. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-31 (2000). 
 79. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Inc., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995) (reviewing 
holdings in several circuits rejecting class actions on the basis of an arbitration agreement). 
But see Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003) (recognizing arbitra-
tor authority to consider class action proceeding). 
 80. See Landsman, supra note 34, at 1610-11 (discussing a range of arbitration agree-
ments prohibiting class proceedings). 
 81. See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); Ingle 
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171-74 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 82. See, e.g., Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1261 (Del. 2001). 
 83. See Landsman, supra note 34, at 1610-11. 
 84. See Garth, supra note 45, at 927-28. 
 85. See Sternlight, supra note 43, at 1651-52. 
 86. See Garth, supra note 45, at 935-36. 
 87. See Issacharoff & Delaney, supra note 41, at 158. 
 88. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Em-
pirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publically Held Companies, 
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007). 
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tion.89  As considered above, the Supreme Court’s decisions in a series of 
cases involving the brokerage business opened the way to the radical ex-
pansion of the FAA.  In the middle 1990s, however, a shift occurred after a 
number of Wall Street firms were caught up in headline-making sexual dis-
crimination cases.90  The victims of harassment and discrimination fought 
to avoid imposed arbitration, claiming that the process was dominated by 
industry-insider elderly white males who could not credibly claim to be fair 
and neutral.91  The victims’ attacks, the sympathetic press coverage they 
received, and the repeated disclosure of lurid financial firm misconduct 
eventually convinced the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(“NASD”), the industry’s self-regulatory organization,92 to withdraw its in-
sistence on mandatory arbitration in such cases.  As the NASD coyly put it, 
“After consideration of all the views presented, and in light of the public 
perception that civil rights claims may present important legal issues better 
dealt with in a judicial setting, the NASD determined that the appropriate 
action was to remove the arbitration requirement for such claims.”93  The 
New York Stock Exchange followed suit shortly thereafter.94  Concerns 
about imposed arbitration have been expressed elsewhere as well and have 
reduced arbitration’s credibility and appeal. 
B. Court-Annexed Mediation 
While compelled arbitration’s reputation has been brought into question, 
another form of compulsory ADR, court-annexed mediation, has expanded 
dramatically.  Part of its appeal has been that, at least as a theoretical mat-
ter, it operates quite differently from arbitration and does not impose solu-
tions on unwilling participants.  Instead, it is supposed to provide “a 
process in which an impartial third party facilitates communication and ne-
gotiation and promotes voluntary decision making by the parties to the dis-
pute.”95  Its preferred status may be glimpsed in the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act passed by Congress in 1998.96  That act sharply restricts the 
binding effect of arbitration when used in the cases of federal court liti-
 
 89. See Landsman, supra note 34, at 1594-96. 
 90. Id. at 1597-98. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1594. 
 93. Id. at 1598 quoted in Paul Rose, Developing a Market for Employment Discrimina-
tion Claims in the Securities Industry, 48 UCLA L. REV. 399, 413 (2000). 
 94. See Landsman, supra note 34, at 1599. 
 95. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM. BAR ASS’N & ASSOC’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS  pmbl. (2005) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR 
MEDIATORS]. 
 96. 28 U.S.C. § 652 (2000). 
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gants97 but imposes no such constraints on the mediation option.98  Forty 
states now provide for mandatory court-annexed mediation.99 
According to the mediation community, the ideal mediation is one go-
verned by party self-determination.  Mediation is claimed to be a process in 
which the parties “com[e] to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each 
party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome.”100  
Compulsory court-annexed mediation often fails to meet this ideal.  Parties 
have no choice whatsoever about whether to participate in mediation.  They 
are mandated to do so by court order.  The methods used to bring parties 
into court-annexed mediation are, to put it plainly, “coercive.”101  This is 
not the conclusion of an opponent of mediation but of one of its earliest and 
staunchest proponents, Frank Sander.102  Professor Sander has argued that 
so long as the coercion ends when parties arrive at the mediator’s door, the 
process remains consistent with the seminal principle of self-
determination.103 
Whether coercion ends at the door to the mediation room is debatable.  
Those who established court-annexed mandatory mediation programs and 
those who run them appear to have a very clear agenda—to settle cases.  
Legislatures that have been persuaded to support such programs have 
viewed them as a cost-effective way of dealing with rising judicial casel-
oads.104  The chief criterion for providing funds has been the number of set-
tlements arranged.105  Courts asked about their mandatory mediation pro-
grams have been equally emphatic.  A survey of Minnesota trial judges, for 
example, indicated that the judges’ fundamental reason for sending cases to 
mediation was so that they would be cleared from the court’s docket and 
settled.106  Similar judicial attitudes are common all over the country.  Crit-
ics of this approach have variously described mediators’ attitudes toward 
 
 97. See Crowne, supra note 48, at 1794. 
 98. Id. at 1793-94. 
 99. See Garth, supra note 45, at 928 n.3. 
 100. STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 95, § 1. 
 101. See Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Media-
tion: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary than Others, 26 JUST. 
SYS. J. 273, 276-79 (2005). 
 102. See generally Frank E. Sander, The Future of ADR: The Earl F. Nelson Memorial 
Lecture, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 3 (2000). 
 103. See id. at 8. 
 104. See Robert W. Rack, Jr., Thoughts of a Chief Circuit Mediator on Federal Court-
Annexed Mediation, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 609, 613 n.21 (2002). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, the Court is in Session: What Judges Say About Court-
Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 394-97 (2007). 
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settlement as an “obsession”107 and as creating a pervasive “bias towards 
settlement.”108  When settlement is king, the idea of self-determination is 
likely to be undercut—the only determination that is acceptable is the one 
that ends the case.  The single measure of success then becomes: how many 
cases can be permanently dispatched.109 
Using settlement as the key metric and objective has skewed the media-
tion process.  The mediators are likely to be sent the cases that judges do 
not want to handle or want to see disappear from the docket.110  This means 
that cases viewed as having less monetary or social significance are the 
ones that will be consigned to mediation.111  Because of the ardent hope 
that mediated cases will not return, there appears to be a judicial inclination 
to simply “hand them off” with little supervision or review.112  Even when 
there is some desire for review, it is likely to be circumscribed by the strict 
rules of confidentiality imposed by many states to insulate mediation pro-
ceedings,113 on the theory that post-mediation secrecy is necessary to foster 
candid negotiations and energetic settlement efforts by the mediator.114 
Given the strong desire for settlement, mediators in court-annexed pro-
grams have adopted a variety of strategies to push parties toward compro-
mise.  At their most benign, these strategies (which are used outside the 
court-annexed context as well as within it) involve the exertion of subtle 
pressure on the parties to see the wisdom of the mediator’s recommenda-
tions about agreements.  After extensive observation of mediators, Susan 
Silby and Sally Merry were able to catalogue a number of these.  They 
noted that mediators routinely assert authority based on their experience in 
arranging settlements, their close relations with the court, and their “supe-
rior knowledge” of the dangers faced by parties who choose to go to tri-
al.115  Mediators augment their power by controlling the agenda of the 
 
 107. Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 241, 265-66 (2006). 
 108. Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—
Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public 
Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 560 (2004). 
 109. See James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Ques-
tions and Tentative Proposals, From an Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 
769, 795 (1997). 
 110. See Garth, supra note 45, at 938. 
 111. See Crowne, supra note 48, at 1770. 
 112. See Thompson, supra note 108, at 513. 
 113. Id. at 564-65. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Susan S. Silby & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & 
POL’Y 7, 12-13 (1986). 
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mediation—deciding who is to speak, on what topics, and when.116  If a 
settlement seems to be within reach, the mediator takes center stage and 
drafts the agreement.117  All of this, according to Silby and Merry, heigh-
tens mediator control and ability to produce settlements.118 
An additional and potentially critical source of mediator power is the 
opportunity to provide the parties with evaluative information concerning 
the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case.  There is a substantial de-
bate within the ADR community about the propriety of evaluation because 
of the pressure it can exert on the parties,119 and the risk that it will turn the 
mediator into a provider of legal assessments.120  The trouble with both of 
these results is that they tend to undermine self-determination and foster 
reliance on the mediator’s judgment.121  Even so, evaluation is a central 
attribute of court-annexed mediation.122  Roselle Wissler, who has done 
some of the best empirical work on such mediation, observed in one of her 
large-scale studies that mediators assisted with case evaluation in 89% of 
the cases observed, opined on the value of the case 66% of the time, listed a 
range of settlement figures in 69% of the cases, and endorsed a single set-
tlement figure 38% of the time.123  These data appear to be fairly represent-
ative of the general run of mediator activity.124 
Some mediators have gone well beyond evaluation in exerting pressure 
or influence to achieve settlement.  These intermediaries have used a num-
ber of tools including manipulation of the duration of proceedings to push 
reluctant parties toward settlement.  The ploy of having parties forego 
lunch is a common tactic125 and some have gone much further—pushing 
mediation sessions to eight126 or even twelve hours,127 sometimes with par-
ties in fragile mental128 or physical129 health.  Other mediators have re-
sorted to intimidation and threats.  In Allen v. Leal,130 a mediator repeatedly 
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 118. See id. at 8. 
 119. See Thompson, supra note 108, at 532. 
 120. See Stark, supra note 109, at 784-86. 
 121. See Thompson, supra note 108, at 533. 
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threatened a party in a police shooting case, declaring that the party had 
“zero chance of success and this will destroy your family [if you do not set-
tle].”131  After this behavior was disclosed, a widely respected Texas me-
diator (Texas was the state in which the case had been filed) declared: “[A] 
little bullying is really just part of how mediation works.”132  The judge in 
Allen felt the need to publicly disavow the mediator’s statement.133 
These and other pressure tactics134 have raised serious questions among 
widely respected ADR advocates about the integrity of court-annexed med-
iation.  Some have suggested that mediation has been “co-opted” into an 
unrelenting pursuit of the courts’ settlement obsession,135 and that this has 
resulted in a system devoted to “reconciling . . . citizens to . . . institutional 
reality”136 rather than fostering genuine self-determination.  Such criticism 
may overstate the difficulties in court-annexed mediation.  The process ap-
pears to work satisfactorily in many places, and users often report satisfac-
tion.137  Yet it may not be a process well designed for the unrepresented.  
They have no advisors to help them deal with the pressures mediators may 
exert.  Interestingly, much of the research on party satisfaction with media-
tion has focused on parties with lawyers rather than those proceeding pro 
se.138  It may be open to question whether the same level of satisfaction 
would be found among the unrepresented. 
Observers have noted that the settlements achieved in court-annexed 
mediation are likely to be powerfully influenced by the law governing the 
underlying dispute.139  Whenever a mediator evaluates the law of a case, he 
or she arguably proves a legal opinion.140  Unrepresented parties will fre-
quently be incapable of appraising the accuracy of such opinions.141  Hav-
ing no other source of legal insight, there is every likelihood that pro se li-
tigants will rely on what the mediator tells them.142  This makes the 
unrepresented particularly vulnerable to the manipulations of mediators 
 
 131. See Hedeen, supra note 101, at 282. 
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bent on achieving settlement.143  This vulnerability is, as will be considered 
below, not the sort that mediators are required to remedy.144  What results 
is a situation in which the pro se litigant is left to face the “(1)trashing, (2) 
bashing, and (3) hashing it out”145 of court-annexed mediation without ad-
vice, protection, or assistance. 
Are there a significant number of pro ses in court-annexed mediation 
programs?  It is not easy to determine.  Anecdotal reports indicate their 
presence and their difficulties in a wide range of settings from housing 
court146 to divorce court.147  Some federal courts bar the assignment of the 
unrepresented to mediation programs,148 but others have taken the opposite 
view.149  In the previously cited survey of Minnesota trial judges, it was re-
ported that 43% would assign pro ses to mandatory mediation—that num-
ber was little different from the 49% of judges who would send those with 
counsel to mediation.150  In a number of ADR settings, most particularly 
some states’ matrimonial cases, pro se status may be imposed and lawyers 
excluded because of the fear that they will “adversarialize” the process.151 
Mediators, unlike judges, are generally not supposed to render “opi-
nions” or provide “advice.”152  They are instructed to remain disengaged 
from the parties.  Anything that would require intervention to protect one 
party is most often classified as a “quasi-judicial function” (a revealing 
choice of words) and is off limits to mediators.153  Those who serve as me-
diators are directed not to assess or guarantee the fairness of agreements.154  
What mediators are supposed to do is urge parties to be vigilant on their 
own behalf and verify all important claims made in the mediation.155  Min-
nesota has mandated a script for its mediators that requires them to inform 
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the parties that the mediator “has no duty to protect [them].”156  Mediators 
have been urged, most particularly, to avoid appraising legal questions.157  
When non-lawyer mediators attempt such appraisals, their efforts may be 
viewed as the unauthorized practice of law.158  When lawyer mediators do 
it, they open themselves to criticism about improper advising.159  Mediators 
have been directed to inform the parties that they should seek their own 
lawyers.160  Twenty states insist that this sort of directive be provided.161 
Whatever else one might say, it is clear that these requirements erect a 
series of barriers to mediators helping pro se litigants.  Mediators are not 
authorized to get involved, and face sharp criticism if they do.  Unfortu-
nately, this presents a virtually insoluble problem for the unrepresented.  
They cannot obtain a lawyer, but have been instructed that they need one, 
and the mediator who tells them this is powerless to appoint counsel or as-
sist them.  While the mediation process does not directly undercut access, it 
sharply increases the need for counsel to counter mediator pressure.  It then 
offers no help with the heightened need it has created. 
Lawyers often improve the mediation process once they are significantly 
involved.  The Uniform Mediation Act appears to agree.  In defending its 
standard of allowing parties to have counsel, the Act’s drafters declared 
that “because of the capacity of attorneys to help mitigate power imbal-
ances, and in the absence of other procedural protections for less powerful 
parties, the Drafting Committees elected to let the parties, not the mediator, 
decide [on the utilization of counsel].”162  Empirical data suggest that attor-
neys do a good job in mediation.  In 2002, Roselle Wissler examined two 
Ohio mediation programs where counsel appeared to be present in virtually 
all cases.163  She found that attorneys engaged in extensive pre-mediation 
client preparation in 57% of the cases studied and virtually all cases had 
some preparation.164  Attorneys spoke more than their clients in 63% of the 
mediations and spoke about as much as their clients in another 31%.165  
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Clients felt less pressure166 and felt that the process was fairer167 because of 
these interventions.  Assessment of an early neutral evaluation program in 
the Northern District of California came to similar conclusions.  There, 
42% of the lawyers undertook earlier case preparation, and 78% of attor-
neys said they were well prepared.168 
Recognizing the challenges mediation can pose, particularly for pro se 
litigants, some states have required additional procedural protections for 
those involved in mediation proceedings.  Some have imposed a post-
agreement “cooling off period” during which the settlement may be res-
cinded.169  This requirement borrows directly from the consumer rights tool 
kit that protects purchasers from high pressure salesmen hawking such 
wares as aluminum siding and encyclopedias.  Other states have insisted 
that before a settlement may be finalized certain “magic words” must be 
agreed to and no other formula will create a binding deal.170  There is a 
demonstrable trend toward more formalized protections across the board—
a trend at odds with the basic informality of mediation,171 and one that 
seems, at least partly, designed to make up for the absence of counsel. 
III.  THE RISKS OF LEAVING PRO SE LITIGANTS UNREPRESENTED IN 
ADR PROCEEDINGS 
Leaving pro se litigants unrepresented in ADR proceedings opens them 
to a number of risks.  The most obvious, of course, is of an unmerited ad-
verse judgment.  While there is little systematic evidence on the point, it 
would appear that pro ses fare badly in a number of ADR settings.  One of 
the few areas scrutinized has been investment industry arbitrations.  There, 
it has been reported that represented investors obtain far better results than 
the unrepresented.172  Other data indicate that consumers (who are, over-
whelmingly, unrepresented) lose 96% of adhesion-contract-imposed arbi-
trations.173  It is hard to believe that these results are warranted, particularly 
in light of the previously discussed case law regarding unconscionable be-
havior by drafting parties and their concerted efforts to stifle legitimate 
claims.  Data regarding mediation are even harder to come by, but recent 
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emphasis on protective legislation and the required warning about the need 
for consultation with independent counsel suggest a general perception of 
participant vulnerability to unfair settlements. 
Apart from loss on the merits, the most serious risk posed by the absence 
of counsel is of a loosening of constraints on bias.  The informality of ADR 
is more likely than formal court proceedings to offer an opening to ADR-
provider bias.174  Courts have elaborate mechanisms to check prejudice and 
an ethos that emphasizes the importance of evenhanded treatment.  It is 
possible that the effect of the absence of these structures is to open the door 
to various sorts of animus.175  The absence of any significant opportunity 
for judges to review ADR proceedings exacerbates the prospect of biased 
behavior, since the processes have been classified as confidential176 and 
placed beyond judicial scrutiny, at least with respect to most questions.177  
A number of ADR critics have forcefully argued that informal and unre-
viewable processes lead to discrimination against women.178  Others have 
noted that the overwhelming majority of ADR providers are high status 
middle aged or older white males.179  Some see this as increasing the pros-
pect of decisions biased against minority-group participants.180  Such dis-
crimination has been observed in some ADR-focused empirical work.181  In 
the arguably analogous context of auto sale negotiations, Ian Ayers has 
found substantial evidence of such discrimination.182 
In the compulsory arbitration setting, bias of another sort is likely to 
arise–that resulting from market pressures on ADR providers to “sell” their 
services.  As previously noted, adhesion contract drafters have the contrac-
tual power to designate ADR providers.  Their choices will generate a flow 
of business that may be critical to provider prosperity.183  Given this de-
pendency, it should come as no surprise that, either consciously or not, 
providers may tilt toward those regularly sending them business.  This does 
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not necessarily mean that arbitrators will decide every case in a contract 
drafter’s favor, but rather that results, on the whole, will be satisfactory to 
such parties.  Otherwise, they are likely to take their business elsewhere.184  
The risks that these business realities pose have led some states to require 
that arbitrators disclose all of their connections to the parties so that the ad-
hering one-shot participant can raise a conflict of interest objection in ap-
propriate cases.185 
The pressure on arbitration service providers to ingratiate themselves to 
corporate clients has led to another sort of bias as well–the adoption of ar-
bitral rules congenial to big business interests.  Providers who customize 
their services to satisfy business objectives are likely to be more popular.186  
This may be what has led several providers to ban class action arbitra-
tions.187  Some providers have gone so far in their efforts to curry business 
favor through procedural manipulation that courts have found them insuffi-
ciently neutral and unable to conduct fair arbitrations.188  For example, a 
number of courts have found that NAF has unconscionably titled its proce-
dures in favor of large corporate clients.189 
Recently the Supreme Court, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
Inc.,190 considered a case in which one side in a legal dispute had effective 
control over the selection of the adjudicator.  Because Massey’s outsized 
judicial campaign contributions clearly raised the most serious questions 
about judicial neutrality, the Court held that due process required the recus-
al of the beneficiary of his largesse.  The Court declared: “Just as no man is 
allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise 
when—without the consent of the other parties—a man chooses the judge 
in his own cause.”191  It seems clear that this sort of thing happens in com-
pulsory arbitration, in all but the most formal sense.  In light of Caperton, 
the due process issue would seem quite serious, indeed. 
Yet a third source of bias has been identified in arbitration, one often re-
ferred to as “repeat player” bias.  Marc Galanter, in a path-breaking 1974 
article, argued that repeat players have a decided advantage in a variety of 
adjudicatory settings because of their experience-based knowledge of the 
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process and their awareness of the predilections of decision makers.192  
These repeat players know how to select the most sympathetic adjudicators 
and how to most effectively argue their positions.  This gives them a po-
werful advantage, which has been observed in the arbitration setting193 and 
has been identified as a matter of concern in mediation as well.194 
For mediation participants, the bias in favor of settlement poses particu-
lar problems.  As already noted, this bias arises out of the pressures exerted 
by both legislatures and courts to see the maximum number of settlements 
arranged.  Since there is little effective review, mediators can push for set-
tlements in cases where the bargain may not be fair.  Mediators may use a 
number of pressure tactics, including partial or inaccurate legal evaluations, 
extended negotiating sessions, and even intimidation.  The result of these 
tactics is that agreements are skewed to the mediator’s need for settlement 
rather than the parties’ needs or wishes.  The most vulnerable participants 
in such cases will be the pro se litigants who must deal with this heightened 
pressure unaided by counsel. 
Much of involuntary ADR is infused with a paternalistic attitude akin to 
the other sorts of bias already discussed.  ADR advocates have felt free to 
“coerce” parties “into” alternatives to the courtroom.195  This sort of coer-
cion undermines self-determination and sets an important precedent.  If 
parties are too ignorant to understand what processes are good for them, so 
the thinking goes, then, perhaps, they are also incapable of recognizing an 
appropriate deal when it is offered.  This kind of analysis provides a justifi-
cation for all types of pressure.  Paternalism is a mindset that deprives its 
subjects of freedom of choice and personal dignity.196  It is also a rejection 
of the voice of the marketplace, suggesting that if consumers do not want 
your product or your solution, it must be the consumers’ fault.  Not only 
businesses, but entire social systems, like the Soviet Union, have failed by 
relying on this command-and-control approach.197  It is a short step from 
paternalism to the adoption of an attitude that views disputants as sufferers 
from a social disease requiring involuntary treatment.198  The dignity-
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destroying and self-serving character of this perspective has been noted by 
critics, especially in the matrimonial context where it has been frequently 
used to deprive women of power and respect.199 
The procedures used in compulsory ADR heighten another sort of risk, 
the adoption of an ill-fitted resolution in derogation of facts or law.  First, 
ADR practitioners generally agree that sessions should be held before dis-
covery is completed.200  This reduces the likelihood that all the salient facts 
will be known and considered in the ADR appraisal of the case.  While cut-
ting discovery short may be defensible when lawyers are available to the 
parties to appraise the risks, the tactic is decidedly more dangerous when 
the unrepresented are involved.  Second, at the sessions held to resolve the 
dispute, no rules of evidence apply, and the introduction of information 
may be curtailed at any time.201  This slights the ascertainment of facts in 
favor of attempts to get resolution.  Again, it is the pro se litigant who is 
likely to be most vulnerable.  Third, ADR providers are generally not ob-
liged to provide findings of fact or conclusions of law.202  There is no way 
to know if critical information has been considered or legal principles rec-
ognized.  All these problems are compounded by strict confidentiality 
rules203 and the absence of appellate review.204  If a mistake is made, a risk 
that is higher with pro se participants, there is no reliable corrective me-
chanism. 
The pressure to settle and the poor quality of proceedings in compulsory 
ADR make it less likely that unrepresented parties will get a real chance to 
voice their views.  The limits imposed by arbitrators and mediators, in a 
hurry to resolve cases, make it difficult for parties to speak up.205  Proceed-
ings tend to be fast with little time for dialogue.206  ADR providers working 
small cases are likely to be poorly compensated,207 if they are paid at all.208  
They are unlikely to see it as their job to devote great time or effort to satis-
fying a party’s desire to tell his or her story.  All of this stacks the deck 
against providing what a number of social scientists call “voice”—the op-
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portunity to express views, tell a story, and feel that one has been heard.209  
Tom Tyler, one of the leading empirical analysts of this question has persu-
asively argued that the opportunity to speak one’s mind and be listened to 
is critical to participant satisfaction.210  If this is correct, what should we 
make of the data suggesting general participant satisfaction with certain 
forms of mandatory ADR?211  The key may be that in most of these forms, 
the parties involved were represented by counsel212 and had multiple op-
portunities for voice both with and through their lawyers.213  Taking the 
lawyers out of the equation substantially heightens the risk of dissatisfac-
tion. 
IV.  RESPONDING TO THE RISKS 
The risks engendered by compulsory ADR have not gone unappreciated.  
They have led to a number of reform proposals and initiatives, the conse-
quence of which has been heightened formality in the ADR process.  Arbi-
trators must make pre-hearing conflict-of-interest disclosures so that more 
effective use may be made of recusal mechanisms.  Scripted warnings must 
be supplied urging parties to seek independent appraisals of fairness.  Inter-
ference with discovery, statutes of limitations, and remedies have all been 
curtailed as potentially unconscionable, at least in some jurisdictions.  One 
particularly canny observer has pointed out that these and other changes 
have injected more law into ADR processes and made them ever more law 
like.214 
The efficacy of these reforms is open to question.  They have begun to 
transform a set of processes that were intended to offer an alternative to law 
into legal proceedings.  This has not been done to advance ADR’s espoused 
principles, but to maintain the credibility of compulsory extrajudicial reso-
lution mechanisms which have generated the sorts of pressures and biases 
likely to undermine legitimacy.  Some leading ADR proponents have been 
appalled by these changes and have argued that they undermine the prin-
ciples and practices that make ADR valuable.215  Some have gone further 
and suggested that what is really needed to ensure fairness is not a set of 
internal constraints, but external judicial review of all compulsory ADR 
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proceedings.216  Such proposals appear wildly impractical.  The sheer vo-
lume of such matters is likely to be overwhelming and any sort of robust 
review would be likely to undercut whatever efficiency advantages ADR 
delivers to the courts.217  Such review is also likely to reduce the free-flow 
of settlements in the courts, thereby reducing the incentive to employ ADR 
techniques.218 
The introduction of counsel into compelled ADR proceedings involving 
pro ses may offer a better solution than formality or review.  Neither of the 
latter two has worked very well.  Formality is inconsistent with the organiz-
ing principles of ADR.  Moreover, formality can only work if it is effec-
tively policed, and the judges seem not to have had the time or motivation 
for that sort of effort.  If fairness is to be achieved, a number of commenta-
tors have concluded, it is the interposition of counsel that will be needed.219  
The UAA recognized a particular utility of counsel in situations where a 
disparity of power exists.220  Lawyers can reduce the pressure felt by ADR 
participants221 and provide a buffer against coercion and manipulation.  
They can supply professional knowledge and judgment,222 thus helping to 
overcome the substantial information disadvantage faced by the unrepre-
sented.223  ADR participants have appreciated counsels’ assistance, where 
available, and found it valuable in helping to secure satisfactory resolu-
tions.224 
All that said, the introduction of counsel poses serious challenges.  The 
first, of course, is the absence of resources to pay for counsel’s help.225  
Lawyers’ time is expensive and effective assistance requires adequate 
preparation.  Finding resources to pay attorneys poses a huge challenge—
one that in the past has intimidated those seeking solutions to a range of 
problems posed by pro se litigants, both civil and criminal.226  Even assum-
ing that resources can be found (a question to be addressed in the next sec-
tion), there remains the risk that the very things that make counsel attrac-
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tive—legal information and forensic skill—may be used by attorneys to 
manipulate clients into accepting inappropriate resolutions.227  This sort of 
difficulty has been encountered in the criminal process228 and may be likely 
to arise in the civil setting if significant time and money pressures are en-
countered.  The answer to this challenge is far from clear but may be a top-
ic particularly appropriate for consideration by the organized bar in its deli-
berations about rules of ethics. 
V.  FOCUSING ON COUNSEL AS A REMEDY 
Compelling the unrepresented to participate in arbitrations or court-
annexed mediations poses clear risks.  It is critical to recognize that in both 
compulsory arbitration and mandated court-annexed mediation the forum 
being imposed on the unrepresented heightens the need for legal advice.  At 
the same time, each setting is structured so as to prohibit assistance from 
the presiding official.  If the imposing entity, either contract drafter or 
court, heightens the need for legal help by its unilateral choice of an ADR 
process and then offers a process where the only realistic opportunity for 
that help is undermined, its action is a serious diminution of the opportunity 
to contest or participate.  Various sets of ADR principles decry any effort 
to bar the participation of counsel retained by a party.229  What happens 
with the pro se litigant is functionally equivalent—assistance is blocked.  
That result should not be permitted.  It intensifies the existing power imbal-
ance and increases the more powerful party’s already substantial advan-
tage. 
In the arbitration process when adhesion contract drafters have seriously 
impaired the prospects of adherents through the manipulation of the 
process, some courts have found the adhesion contract’s requirements un-
conscionable.230  A number of courts have reacted in this way to constraints 
on discovery, the shortening of statutes of limitations, and the revocation of 
remedies.231  Some courts have embraced a similar rationale in voiding a 
prohibition of class actions.232  Especially in the latter case, the underlying 
basis for decision has been the insight that what the ban does is deprive the 
adhering party of access to counsel.233  By a parity of reasoning, where the 
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effect of an individual’s pro se status and the restrictive advising require-
ments (imposed as a part of insistence on mandatory participation in ADR 
proceedings) work to confront the pro se participant with serious legal 
questions while offering no opportunity for advice from the presiding of-
ficer, or otherwise, the process should be deemed unconscionable or the 
party insisting on ADR should be required to provide the disadvantaged 
participant with appropriate legal assistance.  Not only does fundamental 
fairness require such a response but it works as a needed deterrent to those 
who would be tempted to use ADR to deny their opponents an opportunity 
for voice and redress.  It might be argued that such a requirement would 
end ADR as we know it.  First, there is no substantial evidence that if ADR 
officers were required to act in the way judges do that ADR would be un-
dermined.  Second,  in light of recent steps to embrace a form of “unbun-
dling” that allows a lawyer to take on just one aspect of or procedural step 
in a case,234 such a requirement might prove to be reasonably economical 
and a remedy precisely tailored to the special challenge of compelled arbi-
tration involving pro se litigants. 
One other situation should be addressed.  Arbitration clauses have, on 
occasion, sought to curtail statutory entitlements to attorney’s fees.235  The 
clear objective of the statutes involved has been to help those claiming sta-
tutory rights find counsel to assist them in making their claims.236  Where 
such entitlements exist, the shift into arbitration should never be permitted 
to defeat the legislature’s determination that the assistance of counsel is to 
be encouraged to ensure the vindication of meritorious claims.  To allow 
the suspension of the attorneys’ fees provisions is to invite the very sort of 
deprivation the legislature was at pains to overcome.  Otherwise, access to 
a lawyer could be barred at the whim of any adhesion contract drafter. 
Jean Sternlight has argued that compulsory arbitration requirements are, 
in many cases, the functional equivalent of a forced waiver of the Seventh 
Amendment right to jury trial.237  She has pointed out that, usually, waivers 
of constitutional rights are suspect unless they are knowing, voluntary, and 
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intelligent.238  Of course, the waivers affected by adhesive arbitration re-
quirements are none of these things.  Despite the power of Professor Ster-
nlight’s analysis, this argument has not made much headway in the 
courts.239  On the basis of that experience, it is hard to say that a less specif-
ic right—one perhaps arising out of the due process clause to secure access 
to representation—is likely to gain court approval.  Yet, the conscious ef-
fort of some in positions of unilateral power to deprive their opponents of 
all advice and assistance raises questions worthy of judicial consideration.  
When the motive of the powerful is to deny an opponent the opportunity 
for representation, intervention may be warranted.  The federal district 
court in the recent KPMG tax fraud prosecution was faced with something 
like this sort of behavior when the government sought to exert pressure on 
KPMG to cut off the payment of legal fees to various of its accused execu-
tives.240  The court harshly criticized the government for its unfair tactics 
and protected access to counsel paid for by the corporate employer.  The 
criminal setting and the involvement of the government make KPMG dif-
ferent from the present problem, but there is no doubting the court’s belief 
that schemes to cut off access deserve the sharpest rebuke.  The same sort 
of judicial attitude may be observed in a number of cases where pretextual 
claims of conflict of interest have been used in efforts to have counsel re-
moved.241  The consistent theme is judicial antipathy toward strategies that 
seek to deprive parties of counsel’s assistance. 
The situation in mediations is not nearly so clear cut.  There is, general-
ly, no animus on anyone’s part to cut off access when mandatory mediation 
is imposed.  Yet, the result of assigning a pro se litigant to mediation is of-
ten the same—consignment to a forum where advice is unavailable al-
though there is a pressing need.  Some courts, like the Southern District of 
New York, have concluded that placing the self-represented in this position 
is inappropriate and should be prohibited.242  Others, however, have had no 
such scruple.  In light of the risks involved, courts should follow the South-
ern District’s lead or make provision for representation (perhaps “unbun-
dled”) through such mechanisms as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  To do less is to 
join in the manipulative games of those who place settlement ahead of fair 
treatment.  When courts impose burdens that seriously interfere with the 
success of impecunious litigants, they raise significant questions about un-
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equal treatment.  At least on the criminal side, such burdens, be they con-
nected to the purchase of a transcript243 or the testimony of an expert,244 
have been rejected. 
Two particular warning signs suggest the urgency of addressing the 
problem experienced by the unrepresented in compulsory ADR settings.  
The first is the incredibly low rate of success for pro ses in such settings.  
While the data are patchy, they suggest a lopsided win rate for adhesion 
contract drafters and a particular disadvantage for the unrepresented.  These 
results may have other explanations, but the burden of defending them 
should be on those who have imposed processes in which they virtually 
never lose.  While this is an argument specifically addressed to arbitration, 
the high level of settlements in many court-annexed mediation programs 
raises similar questions. 
Recently, the Supreme Court in an ERISA case entitled Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn,245 analyzed the particular dangers that arise 
when a decision maker responsible for resolving disputes over benefits has 
a conflict of interest.  Such conflicts arise, the Court said, when there is a 
“real or seeming incompatibility between one’s private interest and one’s 
public or fiduciary duties.”246  When such circumstances exist care must be 
taken to scrutinize outcomes and reject those that have the appearance of 
self-dealing even at the expense of increasing costs and inefficiency.  In 
compulsory arbitration, the arbitrators who depend on repeat-player adhe-
sion contract drafters for steady employment face such conflicts.  Their 
work should be policed.  Similar concerns have been voiced about the im-
pact of settlement pressure on mediators.  In both settings, the risk needs to 
be addressed either by busy courts or by reliance on the provision of coun-
sel to the disadvantaged. 
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